Hopi Sen insists that In the Black Labour (ITBL) is a Keynsian project. He explains that “fiscal conservatism does not entail short-term fiscal stupidity” and compares ITBL’s publication now to writing a paper in the winter telling people to prepare for spring.
The message is that once the need for fiscal stimulus has passed, the principles of ITBL – not running a budget deficit – can be enshrined through the proposed measures; though not before. For as long as a stimulus is needed, it should be applied.
This seems like a reasonable position. But there is a problem: when will the need for fiscal stimulus pass?
Mainstream predictions now suggest that the economy will be facing a Japan-style lost decade.
If you have an hour, Richard Koo, Chief Economist at the Nomura Research Institute, explains the causes of the eastern economy’s prolonged period of stagnation very well.
In very basic terms, what happened in Japan was that a huge build up of private sector debt has had to be paid down by firms who had borrowed to invest, but not seen adequate initial returns on their investment.
This has meant that now even for firms turning a profit, any surplus generated does not get reinvested into expansion, but rather goes into paying down that existing debt.
Here is a graph of Japan’s debts: private in blue, public in black.
You can see firms paying down their debt. But you can also see public debt increasing.
Why this happens is simple if we remember that:
GDP = C + I + G + (X-M)
Because firms are paying down their debt, investment (I) is low. Consumer spending (C) is unlikely to be making up this gap when everyone is trying to pay down their credit cards with stagnant wages. And the balance of trade (X-M) is less likely to be moving in a positive direction if domestic investment is low.
So state spending (G) makes up the output gap in order to keep GDP positive, avoiding a recession. It’s worth noting that between the years 1995-2002 Japan’s annualised growth rate was as low as 1.2% which means it would have have been routinely negative without the extra public spending, which increased by more than that amount each year. And so the black line on the graph above soars – in fact, Japan’s public debt to GDP ratio outstripped that of all other nations before the crisis hit in 2008:
Deutsche Bank has even forecast Japanese public debt reaching 300% of GDP by 2020.
And the thing is, when economists say that the UK is in for a lost decade, they don’t just mean in terms of symptoms. The same things are happening here.
The UK now has more private sector debt as a % of its GDP than Japan:
And as a result of that, UK investment – here measured in gross fixed capital formation – has declined as a proportion of GDP since the recession and stubbornly refused to come back up.
How does this relate to ITBL?
In short, it may sound alright in principle to be talking about “preparing for spring”. But spring might be a much longer way off than the authors of ITBL seem to think.
The lessons learned from Japan suggest that consistently high budget deficits might be the only policy tool we have to prevent a decade of stagnation turning into a decade of recession – a tool to fill the output gap while our private sector pays down its debt.
This suggests that deficits might need to be a fairly permanent feature of the UK’s economy for some time to come.
Of course, Hopi and Anthony could merely respond that if that’s when spring comes, that’s when spring comes, and that ITBL will still be valuable then.
But if spring is at best two elections away, is it really sensible to be talking about building the Labour Party around it now?






